Maryland Law Review
Volume 77 | Issue 1

Article 13

Why Donald Trump Is Not Andrew Jackson (and
Why That Matters for American Constitutional
Democracy)
Eric Lomazoff

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Law and Politics Commons, and the President/
Executive Department Commons
Recommended Citation
77 Md. L. Rev. 280 (2017)

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.

WHY DONALD TRUMP IS NOT ANDREW JACKSON
(AND WHY THAT MATTERS FOR AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY)
ERIC LOMAZOFF
In mid-February 2017, the Associated Press published a piece by Jonathan Lemire that ran in numerous online outlets: “Trump election has parallels to Andrew Jackson’s presidency.”1 Lemire suggested that Trump, like
Jackson, was an “unvarnished celebrity outsider” who prevailed in an “ugly,
highly personal presidential election” over a “member of the Washington establishment looking to extend a political dynasty in the White House” by
pledging “to represent the forgotten laborer.”2 To burnish the case for his
exercise, Lemire added that Steve BannonTrump’s then-chief strategisthas “pushed the comparison,” and the president “has hung a portrait of
Jackson in the Oval Office.”3
None of these similarities between Trump and Jackson strike me as matters of obvious consequence for thinking about the short or long-term health
of American constitutional democracy. “Outsiders” such as Ulysses Grant
and Dwight Eisenhower have been elected to the presidency and completed
their terms without incident. Incumbents such as Thomas Jefferson and
Rutherford B. Hayes successfully governed following “highly personal” contests.4 Grover Cleveland defeated the grandson of a former president (who
was occupying the Oval Office himself at the time), but that does not appear
to have inhibited his ability to lead the executive branch responsibly. Finally,
Ronald Reagan demonstrated that successful appeals to working-class voters
are not always followed by severe constitutional stress.

© 2017 Eric Lomazoff.
 Assistant Professor of Political Science, Villanova University. An earlier version of this
essay was presented at the 2017 annual meeting of the Maryland Discussion Group on Constitutionalism (a.k.a., the “Maryland Constitutional Law Schmooze”), March 2–3, University of Maryland
School of Law.
1. Jonathan Lemire, Trump Election Has Parallels to Andrew Jackson’s Presidency, AP
NEWS (Feb. 20, 2017), https://apnews.com/dc620710242649989b4fa1380986166d.
2. Id. Jackson’s opponent in the 1828 election, of course, was incumbent president John
Quincy Adams, son of the second president.
3. Id.
4. For a short and readable take on the Hayes-Tilden contest, see Gilbert King, The Ugliest,
Most Contentious Presidential Election Ever, SMITHSONIAN.COM (Sept. 7, 2012),
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/the-ugliest-most-contentious-presidential-election-ever28429530/?no-ist.
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Something in Lemire’s piece did strike me as having constitutional import, however. He quoted Jon Meacham, author of a Pulitzer Prize-winning
biography of our seventh president: “The moment is Jacksonian[,] but do we
have a Jackson in the Oval Office?”5 The function of employing Meacham
here, of course, was to ask how far the similarities between Jackson and
Trump will ultimately run. Will the latter, for examplein a moment of deep
disdain for the substantive outcomes produced by the modern administrative
statechallenge the Federal Reserve’s relative independence in making
monetary policy in the same way that the former challenged the Second
Bank’s comparable autonomy in the same policy realm?6
I was not struck, however, by the function of the Meacham quote within
Lemire’s piece. I was struck by Meacham’s characterization of the current
moment as “Jacksonian.” To liken Trump to a latter-day Jackson is simply
not the same thing (at least to my mind) as suggesting that Trump is governing in a Jacksonian moment; while the former focuses on individual traits,
the latter describes environmental qualities. Otherwise put (to borrow from
Stephen Skowronek), Meacham was describing Trump’s “governing environment.”7
Explaining how presidential incumbents behaveor what “leadership
posture[s]” they adoptin different governing environments is the central
task of Skowronek’s The Politics Presidents Make.8 As such, Meacham’s
suggestion that Trump is governing in a Jacksonian moment led me to ask a
series of nested questions: (1) For Skowronek, which features of a governing
environment predict the type of leadership posture that a president will
adopt? (2) Given his own governing environment, what type of posture did
Andrew Jackson adopt? (3) Is Donald Trump operating in a comparable governing environment? (If so, then Meacham’s characterization of the current
moment is apt.) (4) If not, then in what type of environment is Trump operating, and what leadership postures have similarly situated incumbents
adopted? Finally, and most importantly, (5) What is the constitutional import

5. Lemire, supra note 1 (quoting JON MEACHAM, AMERICAN LION: ANDREW JACKSON IN
THE WHITE HOUSE (2009)).

6. The decision in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) notwithstanding, if the Harvard Law Review agreed to publish an article almost sixty years later that opened by
claiming that the modern “administrative state is unconstitutional, and its validation by the legal
system amounts to nothing less than a bloodless constitutional revolution[,]” then we would be wise
not to dismiss the possibility of a future challenge by President Trump to the Federal Reserve’s
independence (in a moment of frustration with its monetary choices and/or their consequences).
Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1231 (1994)
(footnote omitted).
7. STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE: LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN
ADAMS TO BILL CLINTON 367–68 (1997).
8. Id. at 121, 212–15, 382–85.
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of discerning (or at least venturing an educated guess as to) Trump’s leadership posture? That is to say, what does all of this tell us about Trump’s vision
of American constitutional democracy, and how other actors are likely to respond to that vision?
As the title of this short Essay suggests, I am not at all convinced that
Donald Trump is governing in a Jacksonian moment. All told, I think that
conclusion bodes well for the short-term health of American constitutional
democracy, but it also threatens to exacerbate a longer-term problem.
***
On the assumption that students of American politics are increasingly
familiar with Skowronek’s explanation for variation in presidential leadership,9 I will not offer this point extended treatment. In brief, Skowronek sees
governing environmentshis term of art here is “political time”as shaped
by (1) the strength of the dominant governing coalition or “regime” (i.e., it is
weak or strong), and (2) the incumbent’s relationship to that regime (i.e., he
is affiliated with it, or not).10 Presidents thus govern in one of four environments, or moments in “political time,” with incumbents in each of the four
adopting a distinct leadership posture.11 These four leadership postures, or
the types of “politics that presidents make,” are enumerated in the table below.

9. One participant in this year’s “Schmooze” has even labored to make sense of periodic departmentalist thinking by presidents with that explanation in mind. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON,
POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT,
AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY xi (2007).
10. SKOWRONEK, supra note 7, at 30, 34–36.
11. Id. at 34.
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An assessment of Andrew Jackson’s governing environment, and resulting leadership posture, can be equally brief. “Old Hickory” is one of the few
presidents in American history who ascended to power “in opposition to [a]
weak regime[].”13 Jackson took his election in 1828 not simply as personal
vindication for 1824 (when he won a plurality of the popular vote but ultimately lost to John Quincy Adams in the House), but as evidence that the
American people had authorized him to fundamentally change the way that
business was doneand had long been donein the nation’s capital. Adopting a “reconstructive” leadership posture, Jackson not only “reversed the ideological thrust of the national government” (i.e., embraced a less robust conception of Congress’ powers than his predecessors), but also “transformed
the operating mores of American government” by (among other things) introducing significant change in how the bureaucracy was staffed.14
This brings us to the crux of my interest in the Meacham quote: is
Trump, like Jackson, unaffiliated with a weak regime? Are the conditions
ripe for the 45th president to engage in Skowronek’s “politics of reconstruction”?
Categorizing the current incumbent using Skowronek’s framework has
always struck me as American Political Development’s version of a parlor
game: logical and at least mildly amusing, yet frequently devoid of a clear
end-point. In years past, after introducing the framework, I would invite undergraduates to “play” using Barack Obama. Invariably, debate would turn
not on Obama’s relationship to the dominant governing coalitionall agreed
that he was unaffiliated with the “Conservative” regime, irrespective of
whether its reign began with Nixon’s election in 1968 or Reagan’s in
1980but the strength of that regime. If the organizing principles of late
twentieth and early twenty-first-century American politicsand I would
12. Id. at 36 tbl.1.
13. WHITTINGTON, supra note 9, at 50.
14. SKOWRONEK, supra note 7, at 133. For a comparable take on Jackson as the founder of a
“generational regime,” see GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, ANDREW JACKSON AND THE CONSTITUTION:
THE RISE AND FALL OF GENERATIONAL REGIMES (2007).
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sometimes volunteer a working list consisting of reinvigorated federalism,
structural budget deficits, constitutionalized culture wars, and both professionalization and polarization within Congressremained strong, then
Obama ought to be characterized as a “preemptive” leader. His periodic willingness to criticize the Supreme Court (recall the State of the Union address
in which he criticized Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission15 to
the chagrin of Justice Alito), but not to challenge its supremacy in constitutional interpretation, certainly did not militate against this characterization.16
If those same organizing principles, by contrast, were weakand liberal students, quickly sensing how the parlor game was played, were more inclined
toward this viewthen there was room to argue that Obama was a reconstructive leader in the tradition of Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, FDR, and
Reagan.
This version of the game, however, was probably a faulty oneand that
has significant implications for how we construe Trump’s governing environment, his resulting leadership posture, and (most importantly) his relationship to the constitutional order. In short, I erred in failing to acknowledge
a complicating factor within the game: Skowronek’s suggestion that over
time, we have seen a “progressive proliferation of organized interests and
independent authorities” within American politics.17 This “thickening of the
institutional universe” has made it harder for all presidents, even those “who
hold the most compelling warrants” for action, to offer a frontal challenge to
the status quo in Washington.18 In simpler terms, modern presidents are encountering a Washington that is increasingly immune to attempts to fundamentally disrupt its way of doing things.
So, what is the upshot of this for analyzing a twenty-first-century president’s leadership prospects? More and more of them will adopt a preemptive
leadership posture, less because they are unaffiliated with the ideological
commitments of a strong governing coalition (think of Bill Clinton pitted
against post-1994 Republican majorities) and more because they are unaffiliated (or present themselves as unaffiliated) with the ever-strengthening political culture of the nation’s capital. As such, a better conceived game would
have led my students to conclude that Obama was a preemptive leader, less
for the strength of the Conservative regime in January 2009, and more for his

15. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
16. On preemptive presidents as unlikely to challenge the Court’s interpretive supremacy, see
WHITTINGTON, supra note 9, at 161–229.
17. SKOWRONEK, supra note 7, at 31.
18. Id.
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Inauguration Day desire to challenge the notion that “our system cannot tolerate too many big plans.”19
So, let’s play both versions of the parlor game with Trump. Under the
first version, we evaluate the 45th president in the same way that my students
were asked to evaluate the 44thby asking about the strength of the Conservative regime and the incumbent’s relationship to it. Oft-repeated misgivings about President Trump’s conservatism notwithstanding,20 he has openly
compared himself to Reagan,21 pursued and won the presidential nomination
of the Republican Party, and nominated a lifelong conservative to the Supreme Court. It would be difficult, on this basis, to conclude that Trump is
anything but an affiliated leader. (Such leaders, Skowronek reminds us, frequently inspire heated disputes over what it means to be a “faithful” follower
of the regime’s founder.)22 Trump’s leadership posture would then turn on
the strength of the Conservative regime: “orthodox-innovative” if it were
strong, “disjunctive” if it were weak. And I imagine that judgments on this
question might turn on how much the judge wants a generation-defining
Democratic landslide in 2020.
Under the second versionthe version that acknowledges a “thickening
of the institutional universe”23 over time—we also evaluate the 45th president
by asking about the strength of the current regime and his relationship to it.
This time, however, the “regime” is defined less by a combination of constitutional, fiscal, and social conservatism and more by the range of “interests
and authorities” that have developed within the federal government and the
“organizational resilience of the institutions that defend them.”24 As with the
first version, let’s begin with Trump’s relationship to the regime. If there is
a case to be made that Trump is affiliated with the Conservative regime, then
there is an even stronger case to be made that he is unaffiliated with Washington’s well-established “institutional universe.” To run (and win) as a stridently “anti-establishment” candidate is to promise an oppositional leadership posture.

19. Barack Obama, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2009) (transcript available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PPP-2009-book1/pdf/PPP-2009-book1-Doc-pg1.pdf).
20. For an early expression of anxiety, see Peter Wehner, Donald Trump Is Many Things. Conservative Isn’t One of Them, COMMENTARY (Aug. 20, 2015), https://www.commentarymagazine.com/politics-ideas/campaigns-elections/donald-trump-not-conservative/.
21. Nick Gass, Trump Defends Himself: I’m a Conservative, POLITICO (Aug. 20, 2015),
http://www.politico.com/story/2015/08/donald-trump-im-a-conservative-jeb-bush-121554.
22. For a discussion of George H.W. Bush along these lines, see SKOWRONEK, supra note 7,
at 429–42.
23. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
24. SKOWRONEK, supra note 7, at 443.
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Setting aside the obvious problem hereone account of “regime” leads
to the conclusion that Trump is an affiliated leader, and another to the opposite conclusionlet’s turn to the question of which of the two leadership postures (reconstruction or preemption) he would occupy qua unaffiliated incumbent. As with the first version of the game, the answer turns on whether
the regime in question is strong or weak. On the one hand, Trump is talking
and acting as if the regime is weak, or certainly vulnerable to a significant
assault. Having your chief strategist push a comparison with a reconstructive
leader, and hanging a portrait of said leader in your office, sends a powerful
message about how the 45th president sees himself. Moreover, departmentalist thinking and behavior with respect to constitutional interpretationof
which there has been more than a hint in both Trump’s tweets25 and the language of his Senior Policy Advisor26has historically been a feature (as
Keith Whittington has shown) of reconstructive leadership alone.27
On the other hand, there are two (related) reasons to doubt Trump’s apparent conclusion that our “institutional universe” is weak. First, reconstructive leaders tend to assume power following a decisive electoral triumph.
Think here of Jefferson in 1800 (the ensuing shenanigans with Aaron Burr
notwithstanding), Jackson in 1828, Lincoln in 1860, FDR in 1932, and
Reagan in 1980.28 Trump’s electoral victory, by contrast, did not even include a triumph in the national popular vote. It is worth noting that no similarly situated incumbentJohn Quincy Adams, Rutherford B. Hayes, Benjamin Harrison, or George W. Bushadopted a reconstructive leadership
25. I refer here, of course, to his labeling of federal judge James Robartauthor of the temporary restraining order with respect to the executive order on immigrationas a “so-called judge[.]”
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 4, 2017, 5:12 AM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/827867311054974976?lang=en.
26. Appearing on NBC’s Meet the Press on February 12, three days after a panel of three
judges on the Ninth Circuit unanimously refused to reinstate the executive order on immigration,
Stephen Miller suggested, “we’ve heard a lot of talk about how all the branches of government are
equal. That’s the point: they are equal. There’s no such thing as judicial supremacy.” Full Miller
Interview: ‘There’s No Such Thing as Judicial Supremacy’, MEET THE PRESS (NBC television
broadcast Feb. 12, 2017), http://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/video/full-miller-interviewthere-s-no-such-thing-as-judicial-supremacy-875527747603 (emphasis added). The language in
question begins at roughly the 1:03 mark.
27. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 9, at 28–81.
28. In each of these elections, either the president-elect secured a sizeable Electoral College
majority (Jackson over Adams by a margin of 178 to 83; Lincoln at 180 versus his closest competitor, Breckenridge, at 72; FDR over Hoover by a margin of 472 to 59; and Reagan over Carter by a
comparable count of 489 to 49), or a narrower victory was supplemented by his party’s seizure of
House and Senate majorities (Jefferson and his fellow Democratic-Republicans in the “Revolution
of 1800”). For the Electoral College figures from the 1828, 1860, 1932, and 1980 elections, see
SIDNEY M. MILKIS & MICHAEL NELSON, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY: ORIGINS AND
DEVELOPMENT, 1776–1993, at 460–464 (1994). On the Jefferson-Adams tilt, see JAMES ROGER
SHARP, THE DEADLOCKED ELECTION OF 1800: JEFFERSON, BURR, AND THE UNION IN THE
BALANCE (2010).

2017]

WHY DONALD TRUMP IS NOT ANDREW JACKSON

287

posture. Second, part of what facilitates a decisive electoral triumph in the
first place is a “general political consensus that something fundamental ha[s]
gone wrong in the high affairs of state.”29 When a presidential candidate
loses the popular vote and only manages to secure an Electoral College triumph by narrowly flipping three swing states from the previous election cycle, there is reason to doubt that such a “consensus” exists.
That would leave us, of course, with the preemptive leadership posture,
or the “output” expected when the “inputs” are a strong regime and an incumbent unaffiliated with it. I will close this Essay by exploring the constitutional import of Trump as a preemptive leader. Before I do that, however,
three points appear to be in order. First, to classify the Republican incumbent
in this manner would be to offer him the same classification as his Democratic predecessor. Second, that result would hardly be at odds with Skowronek’s understanding of the modern presidency (as outlined above). Insofar
as Obama and Trump have each militated (in their own way) against Washington’s “institutional universe,” they are perhaps the prophets of what
Skowronek calls “Perpetual Preemption.”30 Finally, and most importantly,
Skowronek reminds us that all unaffiliated leaders “test[] the resilience of the
institutional infrastructure of the old order.”31 In classifying President Trump
as a preemptive rather than reconstructive leader, then, I am merely guessing
(or perhaps just hoping) that the strength of the current regime is sufficient
to withstand the test that he has already begun to offer.
***
If Trump is, in fact, operating within a governing environment that is
conducive to preemptive leadership, what does that portend for the short and
long-term health of American constitutional democracy? In the short term,
if presidential history (coupled with Trump’s managerial style) is any guide,
we should look for (1) the high drama of “de facto if not de jure” impeachment, and (2) an attending vindication of constitutional principles.32 In the
longer term, however, I fear that even an appropriate use (or near use) of the
Constitution’s procedures for impeachment and removal, especially when
coupled with the growing frequency of preemptive leadership, will only work
to strengthen a “toxic political culture” that seems increasingly committed to
deploying these “nuclear weapon[s] of American politics” as if they were
conventional explosives.33

29. SKOWRONEK, supra note 7, at 37.
30. See id. at 442.
31. Id. at 45.
32. Id. at 44.
33. DAVID E. KYVIG, THE AGE OF IMPEACHMENT: AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE
SINCE 1960, ix, 2 (2008).
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Let me close by briefly expanding on these claims about the short- and
long-term implications of Trump as a preemptive leader, beginning with the
former. In the first edition of The Politics Presidents Make, published in
1993, Skowronek observed that three of the presidents who have skirted the
bounds of impeachment, or actually inspired proceedingsJohn Tyler, Andrew Johnson, and Richard Nixonall engaged in the politics of preemption.34 A revised edition of the book, published shortly after Bill Clinton’s
second inauguration in early 1997, included a postscript in which Skowronek
suggested that the 42nd president fell within the same category and warned
of the “historic connection between preemptive leadership and constitutional
crises.”35 Needless to say, we know how that story ended.
The lesson here, of course, is that if Trump is in fact a preemptive leader,
then he runs a higher-than-average risk of provoking real or de facto impeachment proceedings. “Average” risk here flows from the fact that all incumbents are liable to be impeached and removed from office for “egregious
official conduct.”36 The first draft of this Essay was written as Trump’s administration was reeling from (1) a Washington Post report that the president
“revealed highly classified information to the Russian foreign minister and
ambassador in a White House meeting” on May 10,37 and (2) a New York
Times report that he asked then-FBI director James B. Comey to “shut down
the federal investigation into . . . former national security adviser, Michael T.
Flynn” on February 14.38 That draft was revised as the president faced intense criticism for (1) encouraging National Football League owners to “fire”
players who chose to protest police brutality and racial inequality by kneeling
during the National Anthem,39 and (2) implying that Hurricane Maria was not
a “real catastrophe” like Hurricane Katrina.40 Whether any of this conduct is
sufficiently egregious to warrant impeachment and removal remains, of
course, for the House and the Senate to decide. Irrespective of Congress’s

34. SKOWRONEK, supra note 7.
35. Id. at 464.
36. Kyvig, supra note 33, at 30.
37. Greg Miller & Greg Jaffe, Trump Revealed Highly Classified Information to Russian ForPOST
(May
15,
2017),
eign
Minister
and
Ambassador,
WASH.
http://wapo.st/2pPSCIo?tid=ss_tw&utm_term=.c0817bf32132.
38. Michael S. Schmidt, Comey Memo Says Trump Asked Him to End Flynn Investigation,
N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2rnVVrw.
39. Jeremy Gottlieb & Mark Maske, Roger Goodell Responds to Trump’s Call to ‘Fire’ NFL
Players Protesting During National Anthem, WASH. POST. (Sept. 23, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/early-lead/wp/2017/09/22/donald-trump-profanely-implores-nfl-owners-to-fireplayers-protesting-national-anthem/?utm_term=.6d17746a9d1b.
40. Willa Frej & Marina Fang, Trump Downplays Puerto Rico’s Suffering, Says It’s Not A
‘Real Catastrophe Like Katrina’, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/trump-visits-puerto-rico_us_59d3640de4b0655781554854.
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conclusions here, Trump’s status as a preemptive leader only works to enhance his risk profile. Insofar as the president fancies himself a reconstructive leader, substantial challenges to the well-established ways of Washington may “ultimately galvanize[] it into an order-affirming defense of the
government as it [is].”41 Real or de facto impeachment proceedings that flow
from such challengesfor example, a serious presidential effort to deconstruct the modern administrative state42—would represent a signal (to paraphrase and repurpose Obama’s words from January 2009) that our system
really cannot tolerate certain kinds of big plans.43
As for the long-term implications of Trump as a preemptive leader, let
us assume (at least for the moment) that Trump’s elevated risk of constitutional drama translates into real or de facto impeachment proceedings in the
near future (say, prior to January 2021). Moreover, let us assume both that
(1) these proceedings are justified, and (2) they yield a vindication of our
constitutional principles (whether by the President’s resignation, his removal
from office by the Senate, or his retention of the presidency coupled with
appropriate behavioral change). I am not at all certain that this scenario (and
more particularly, its conclusion) would actually be cause for celebration.
More to the point, I am concerned that it would portend both the extension
and the strengthening of what the late historian David Kyvig called the “age
of impeachment.”
My concern here springs from the confluence of two trends within
American politics. The first involves a recent uptick in use of the Constitution’s impeachment and removal mechanisms. Kyvig argued that these
mechanisms have enjoyed “extraordinarily frequent use” since 1960use
that rivals that of the entire period between 1789 and 1959.44 Without attributing the recent “slide in popular respect for government” entirely to “[t]he
repeated experience of watching democratically chosen federal officials considered for impeachment[,]” he suggested that their role in that development
“cannot be ignored.”45 If Kyvig is correct, then even justified proceedings

41. SKOWRONEK, supra note 7, at 44.
42. David French, Trump Wants to Deconstruct the Regulatory State? Good. Here’s How You
Start, NAT’L. REV. (Feb. 24, 2017), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/445226/administrativestate-deconstruction-trump-steve-bannon-cpac.
43. If I am overestimating the strength of the current “institutional universe,” however, then
we will need to face Skowronek’s dark prophecy of a twenty-first-century president who “recall[s]
the themes of past greatness and take[s] these as the marks of a truly great leader.” This “great
repudiator” would “fill the empty truisms of the classic reconstructive stance with a substance that
seriously undermines the checks on power that the Constitution still affords.” SKOWRONEK, supra
note 7, at 442–43.
44. Kyvig, supra note 33, at vii, 383.
45. Id. at 403.
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against our current president would reinforce this “culture of impeachment”
and thus work to further erode popular respect for government.46
A single incumbent, of course, can only reinforce a “culture of impeachment” so much. But the second trend of interest herethe increasing frequency of preemptive leadershippromises to supply American politics
with a steady stream of presidents with higher-than-average risk of impeachment and removal. And if one or more of these future preemptors meet the
same constitutional fate as Nixon, Clinton, and (for the sake of argument)
Trump, then Kyvig’s “age of impeachment” promises to extend well into the
twenty-first century. More ominously, each successive employment (or near
employment) of constitutional mechanisms designed for “extraordinary occasions” will further condition us to think of them as ordinary tools.47 The
point here, of course, is less to downplay the unique danger that Donald
Trump may pose to the constitutional order and more to highlight the fact
that the short-term “cure” provided by resignation, impeachment and removal, or behavioral change under the threat of removal may also work to
strengthen a longer-term “disease” of American constitutionalism.

46. Id. at 387.
47. Id. at 2.

